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Abstract. We present a passive approach to the security analysis of quantum
key distribution (QKD) with an untrusted source. A complete proof of its
unconditional security is also presented. This scheme has significant advantages
in real-life implementations as it does not require fast optical switching or
a quantum random number generator. The essential idea is to use a beam
splitter to split each input pulse. We show that we can characterize the
source using a cross-estimate technique without active routing of each pulse.
We have derived analytical expressions for the passive estimation scheme.
Moreover, using simulations, we have considered four real-life imperfections:
additional loss introduced by the ‘plug&play’ structure, inefficiency of the
intensity monitor noise of the intensity monitor, and statistical fluctuation
introduced by finite data size. Our simulation results show that the passive
estimate of an untrusted source remains useful in practice, despite these four
imperfections. Also, we have performed preliminary experiments, confirming the
utility of our proposal in real-life applications. Our proposal makes it possible to
implement the ‘plug&play’ QKD with the security guaranteed, while keeping
the implementation practical.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a means of sharing a secret key between two parties,
a sender Alice and a receiver Bob, securely in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve [1]–[3].
The unconditional security of QKD has been rigorously proved [4], even when implemented
with imperfect real-life devices [5, 6]. The decoy state method was proposed [7]–[12] and
experimentally demonstrated [13, 14] as a means to dramatically improve the performance of
QKD with imperfect real-life devices with unconditional security still guaranteed [5, 9].
A large class of QKD setups adopts the so-called ‘plug&play’ architecture [15, 16]. In
this setup, Bob sends strong pulses to Alice, who encodes her quantum information on them
and attenuates these pulses to quantum level before sending them back to Bob. Both phase and
polarization drifts are intrinsically compensated for, resulting in a very stable and relatively low
quantum bit error rate (QBER). These significant practical advantages make the ‘plug&play’
very attractive. Indeed, most of the current commercial QKD systems are based on this particular
scheme [17, 18].
The security of ‘plug&play’ QKD was a long-standing open question. A major concern
arises from the following fact: when Bob sends strong classical pulses to Alice, Eve can
freely manipulate these pulses, or even replace them with her own sophisticatedly prepared
pulses. That is, the source is equivalently controlled by Eve in the ‘plug&play’ architecture.
New Journal of Physics 12 (2010) 023024 (http://www.njp.org/)
3Figure 1. A general schematic of secure QKD with an unknown and untrusted
source. The filter guarantees the single-mode assumption. The phase randomizer
guarantees the phase randomization assumption. The photon number analyzer
(PNA) estimates photon number distribution of the source. Various PNAs are
shown in figure 2.
In particular, it is no longer correct to assume that the photon number distribution is Poissonian,
as is commonly assumed in standard security proof. This is a major reason why standard security
proofs such as GLLP [5] do not appear to apply directly to the ‘plug&play’ scheme.
It might be tempting to apply the central-limit theorem [19] to the current problem.
That is, the photons contained in a pulse after heavy attenuation obey a Gaussian distribution
asymptotically. The central-limit theorem was adopted in [20].
However, the central-limit theorem does not apply to the situation that the current paper
is addressing. The current paper, as well as a previous work [21], does not rely on the central-
limit theorem and removes the assumption on the input photon number distribution. That is, our
analysis applies to sources with an arbitrary photon number distribution. For example, imagine
a source that follows a dual-delta distribution (i.e. the pulses sent by the source contain either
n1 or n2 photons, where n1 and n2 are large and different integers). In this case, even if Alice
applies heavy attenuation on the input pulses, the resulting photon number per pulse distribution
would be the sum of two Gaussian distributions, which in general is not a Gaussian distribution.
The dual-delta distributed source is of significant practical meaning rather than a purely
imaginary source. Consider the case of the Trojan horse attack [20]: an eavesdropper
occasionally sends a bright pulse to Alice and splits the corresponding output signal from Alice.
In this case, the input photon number per pulse distribution on Alice’s side would have two
peaks: one corresponds to the photon number of the authentic source, and the other corresponds
to the sum of the photon numbers from the two pulses (one from the authentic source and
the other one from the eavesdropper’s probing pulse). The security analysis that is based on
the central-limit theorem (e.g. [20]) may not be directly applicable to this case. However, the
analysis proposed in [21] and in the current paper can analyze such a case simply by defining
an appropriate input photon number range of the untagged bits such that most input pulses are
included. Note that the input photon number range for the untagged bits is defined in the post-
processing stage, during which Alice has already collected the photon number distribution of
the samples.
The unconditional security of the ‘plug&play’ QKD scheme has been recently proven
in [21]. The basic idea is illustrated in figure 1. A filter guarantees the single-mode assumption.
A phase randomizer guarantees the phase randomization assumption. Note that for the state
that is accessible to the eavesdropper, Alice’s phase randomization is equivalent to a quantum
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4Figure 2. Different schemes to estimate photon number distribution.M,M′ and
N are random variables for input photon number, virtual input photon number
and output photon number, respectively. All the internal loss of Alice is modeled
as a λ/(1− λ) beam splitter (in (a) and (b)) or a λ′/(1− λ′) beam splitter (in (c)).
(a) Active scheme, (b) passive scheme and (c) hybrid scheme. q ′ = ηIM(1− q),
where ηIM 6 1 is the efficiency of the imperfect intensity monitor. λ′ = qλ/q ′.
Note that the scheme shown in (c) is a virtual setup that has features from both
the active scheme (a) and the passive scheme (b). The purpose of introducing this
virtual scheme (c) is to bridge the active scheme (a) and the passive scheme (b).
non-demolition (QND) measurement of the photon numbers of the optical pulses. See
appendix A for details. Therefore, from now on, without loss of generality, we will assume
that Alice’s input signal is a classical mixture of Fock states and, similarly, Alice’s output signal
is also a classical mixture of Fock states. A PNA estimates photon number distribution of the
source. Details of the PNA in [21] are shown in figure 2(a).
The analysis presented in [21] applies to a general class of QKD with unknown and
untrusted sources besides ‘plug&play’ QKD. For example, many QKD implementations use
pulsed laser diodes as the light source. These laser diodes are turned on and off frequently to
generate a laser pulse sequence. However, such laser pulses are not in a coherent state and the
photon number per pulse does not obey Poisson distribution [21]. Moreover, the go-and-return
scheme is also adopted by the recently proposed ground-satellite QKD project [22], in which
the source is also equivalently unknown and untrusted.
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following manner: each input pulse will be randomly routed to either an encoder in figure 2(a)
as a coding pulse or a perfect intensity monitor in figure 2(a) as a sampling pulse. The
photon numbers of each sampling pulse are individually measured by the intensity monitor.
In particular, one can obtain an estimate of the fraction of coding pulses that has a photon
number m ∈ [(1− δ)M, (1 + δ)M] (here δ is a small positive real number and M is a large
positive integer; both δ and M are chosen by Alice and Bob). These bits are defined as
‘untagged bits’. The details of security analysis results of [21] are presented in appendix B.
We note that some security analyses about QKD with a fluctuating source have been reported
recently [23]–[26].
It is challenging and inefficient to implement the scheme proposed in [21], which is referred
to as an active scheme, for the following reasons: (1) The optical switch in figure 2(a) is an
active component and requires real-time control. The design and manufacture of the optical
switch and its controlling system can be very challenging in high-speed QKD systems, which
can operate as fast as 10 GHz [27]. (2) The random routing of optical pulses requires a high-
speed sampling quantum random number generator (sampling QRNG), which does not yet exist
for Gb/s systems. (3) The number of pulses sent to Bob is only a constant fraction (say half) of
the number of pulses generated by the source, which means the key generation rate per pulse
sent by the source is reduced by that fraction.
Naturally, the optical switch can be replaced by a beam splitter, which will passively split
every input pulse, sending a portion into the intensity monitor and the rest to the encoder. This
is referred to as a passive scheme. In this scheme, the sampling QRNG is not required.
A very recent work proposed some preliminary analysis on the passive estimation of an
untrusted source using inverse Bernoulli transformation, and performed some experimental
tests [28]. It is very encouraging to see that it is possible to prove the security of the passive
estimate scheme for QKD with an untrusted source. As acknowledged by the authors of [28],
the inverse Bernoulli transformation is beyond the computational power of current computers,
and the required photon number resolution is beyond the capabilities of practical photodiodes.
Owing to the above challenges, the experimental data reported in [28] were not analyzed by the
analysis proposed in the same paper.
In this paper, we propose a passive scheme to estimate the photon number distribution
of an untrusted source together with a complete proof of its unconditional security. We show
that the unconditional security can still be guaranteed without routing each input optical pulse
individually. Our analysis provides both an analytical method to calculate the final key rate and
an explicit expression of the confidence level. Moreover, we considered the inefficiency and
finite resolution of the intensity monitor, making our proposal immediately applicable. In the
numerical simulation, we considered the additional loss introduced by the ‘plug&play’ structure
and the statistical fluctuation introduced by the finite data size. We also gave examples of
imperfect intensity monitors in the simulation, in which a constant Gaussian noise is considered.
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we propose a modified active estimate
method; in section 3, we establish the equivalence between the modified active scheme proposed
in section 2 and the passive estimate scheme; in section 4, we present a more efficient passive
estimate protocol than the one proposed in section 3; in section 5, we present the numerical
simulation results of the protocol proposed in section 4 and compare the efficiencies of active
and passive estimates; in section 6, we present a preliminary experiment based on our proposed
passive estimate protocol.
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62. Modified active estimate
In [21], it is shown that Alice can randomly pick a fixed number of input pulses as sampling
pulses, and measure the number of untagged sampling bits. One can then estimate the number
of untagged coding bits.
We find that we can modify the scheme proposed in [21] by drawing a non-fixed number of
input pulses as samples. A passive estimate can be built on top of this modified active estimate
scheme. Note that we only modified the way to estimate the number of untagged coding bits.
Once the number of untagged coding bits is estimated, the security analysis proposed in [21] is
still applicable to calculate the lower bound of the secure key rate.
Lemma 1. Consider that k pulses are sent to Alice from an unknown and untrusted source,
within which V pulses are untagged. Alice randomly assigns each bit as either a sampling bit
or a coding bit with equal probabilities (both are 1/2). In total, Vs sampling bits and Vc coding
bits are untagged. The probability that Vc 6 Vs − k satisfies
P(Vc 6 Vs − k)6 exp
(
−k
2
2
)
, (1)
where  is a small positive real number chosen by Alice and Bob.
That is, Alice can conclude that Vc > Vs − k with confidence level
τ > 1− exp
(
−k
2
2
)
. (2)
Proof. See appendix C. uunionsq
Note that the right-hand side of equation (1) is independent of V . This is important because
Alice does not know the exact value of V , whereas Eve may know and may even manipulate
the value of V . Nonetheless, the inequality suggested in equation (1) holds for any possible
value of V . Therefore, Alice can always estimate that Vc > Vs − k with confidence level
τa >1− exp(−k2/2). Note that the estimate given in lemma 1 is actually quite good for us
because we will mainly be interested in the case where V is close to k.
3. From active estimate to passive estimate
The PNA of our proposed scheme is shown in figure 2(b) and the entire scheme is shown in
figure 3. We replaced the 50/50 optical switch in figure 2(a) by a q/(1− q) beam splitter in
figure 2(b). In this scheme, each input pulse is passively split into two: one (defined as U pulse)
is sent to the encoder and transmitted to Bob and the other (defined as L pulse) is sent to the
intensity monitor. The visualization of U/L pulses is shown in figure 4.
One may naïvely think that since the beam splitting ratio q is known, one can easily
estimate the photon number of the U pulse from the measurement result of photon number
of the corresponding L pulse. However, this is not true. Any input pulse, after the phase
randomization, is in a number state. Therefore, for a pair of U and L pulses originating from
the same input pulse, the total photon number of the two pulses is an unknown constant.
This restriction suggests that we should not treat the photon numbers of two such pulses as
independent variables, and the random sampling theorem cannot be directly applied.
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7Figure 3. A schematic diagram of our proposed secure QKD scheme with a
passive estimate on an unknown and untrusted source. The filter guarantees
the single-mode assumption, and the q/(1− q) beam splitter and the intensity
monitor are used to passively estimate the photon number of input pulses. All the
internal losses inside Alice’s local lab are modeled as a λ/(1− λ) beam splitter.
That is, any input photon has λ probability to get encoded and sent from Alice to
Bob and 1− λ probability to be lost.
Figure 4. Visualization of different types of pulses. BS: beam splitter; ENC:
encoder; IM: intensity monitor. Each input pulse is randomly assigned as either
a coding pulse or a sampling pulse. After entering the beam splitter, each pulse
is split into a U pulse that enters the encoder and an L pulse that enters the
intensity monitor. As a result, there are four types of pulses: coding U pulse,
coding L pulse, sampling U pulse and sampling L pulse.
To bridge the active scheme (in figure 2(a)) and the passive scheme (in figure 2(b)), we
introduce a virtual setup (in figure 2(c)). We call such a virtual setup a ‘hybrid’ scheme because
it has features from both the active and the passive schemes.
We assume that the inefficiency of the intensity monitor can be modeled as an additional
loss [28]. In the passive scheme (figure 2(b)), assuming that the efficiency of the intensity
monitor is ηIM 6 1, the probability that an input photon is detected is
q ′ = (1− q)ηIM. (3)
Therefore, we could model the q/(1− q) beam splitter and the inefficient intensity monitor in
figure 2(b) as a q ′/(1− q ′) beam splitter and a perfect intensity monitor as in figure 2(c).
The above modification changes the probability that an input photon is sent to Bob. To
ensure that an identical attenuation is applied to the coding pulses in both the passive scheme
(in figure 2(b)) and the hybrid scheme (in figure 2(c)), we re-define the internal transmittance in
the virtual setup as
λ′ = qλ/q ′ 6 1. (4)
New Journal of Physics 12 (2010) 023024 (http://www.njp.org/)
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determined by the internal loss [21]. Since the internal losses in the passive scheme and
the hybrid scheme are identical, for a given input photon number distribution (which can be
unknown), the output photon number distribution of the passive scheme is identical to that of the
hybrid scheme. Moreover, the photon number distributions obtained by the intensity monitors
are also identical for these two schemes.
Note that this virtual setup is not actually used in an experiment, but is purely for building
the equivalence between the active and the passive schemes.
By putting equations (3) and (4) together, we have one constraint:
λ′ = qλ
(1− q)ηIM 6 1. (5)
This constraint is very easy to meet in an actual experiment as λ can be lower than 10−6 in a
practical setup [21], q/(1− q)6 100 in typical beam splitters and ηIM can be greater than 50%
in commercial photodiodes3.
The resolution of the intensity monitor is another important imperfection. In a real
experiment, the intensity monitor may indicate that a certain pulse contains m ′ photons. Here
we refer to m ′ as the measured photon number in contrast to the actual photon number m.
However, due to the noise and the inaccuracy of the intensity monitor, this pulse may not
contain exactly m ′ photons. To quantify this imperfection, we introduce a term ‘the conservative
interval’ ς . We then define V L as the number of L pulses with measured photon number
m ′ ∈ [(1− δ)M + ς, (1 + δ)M − ς ]. One can conclude that, with confidence level τc = 1− c(ς),
the number of untagged L bits V L > V L. One can make c(ς) arbitrarily close to 0 by
choosing large enough ς 4. The conservative interval is a statistical property rather than an
individual property. That is, for one individual pulse, the probability that |m −m ′|> ς can be
non-negligible.
In the virtual setup, input pulses are treated in the same manner as in the active estimate
scheme: coding pulses are routed to the encoder and then sent to Bob, whereas the sampling
pulses are routed to the perfect intensity monitor to measure their photon numbers. We can
use the measurement results of sampling pulses to estimate the number of untagged bits in the
coding pulses. Knowing the number of untagged bits, one can easily calculate the upper and
lower bounds of the output photon number probabilities [21].
Since the passive scheme and the hybrid scheme share the same source, the output photon
number distribution is solely determined by the internal loss. The internal transmittances for the
coding bits are the same (q ′λ′ = qλ) for both schemes. Therefore, the upper and lower bounds
of output photon number probabilities estimated from the hybrid scheme are also valid for those
of the passive scheme.
Corollary 1. Consider k pulses sent from an unknown and untrusted source to Alice, where k is
a large positive integer. Alice randomly assigns each input pulse as either a sampling pulse or a
coding pulse with equal probabilities. Define variables V Ls and V Uc as the number of untagged
3 Several commercial high-speed InGaAs photodiodes, including Thorlabs FGA04, JDSU EPM745 and
Hamamatsu G6854-01, are claimed to have conversion efficiency over 70% at 1550 nm.
4 The specific expression of c(ς) depends on the properties of a specific intensity monitor. Nonetheless, one
can always make c(ς) arbitrarily close to 0 by choosing a large enough ς . That is, ∀ζ > 0, we can always find
|ς ∈ [0, δM]| such that for any |ς > ς |, we have c(ς) < ζ . Note that c(δM)= 0.
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defined as pulses sent to the encoder in figure 4, and L pulses are defined as pulses sent to the
intensity monitor in figure 4. Alice can conclude that V Uc > V Ls − 1k with confidence level τ1 >
1− e−k21/2. Here 1 is a small positive real number chosen by Alice and Bob. To calculate the
upper and lower bounds of output photon number probabilities, one should use equivalent inter-
nal transmittance λ′, which is given in equation (5), instead of actual internal transmittance λ.
Proof. The sampling L pulses are sent to a perfect intensity monitor with a probability
q ′ = qηIM. If we apply the same transmittance q ′ to the coding U pulses, we can consider
sampling L pulses and the coding U pulses as a group of pulses that go through the same
attenuation, and we randomly assign each pulse in the group as either a sampling L pulse or a
coding U pulse with equal probabilities. Therefore, one can conclude that V Uc > V Ls − 1k with
confidence level τ1 > 1− e−k21/2 by applying Lemma 1. Since the overall transmittance for the
U pulses is qλ, the internal transmittance for the untagged coding U pulses should be considered
as λ′ = qλ/q ′. uunionsq
There is no physical location (e.g. between the beam splitter and the encoder in figure 4)
where the U pulses see a transmittance of q ′ in the passive scheme. The output photon number
probabilities of the coding U pulses are analyzed in the following manner: The coding U pulses,
after propagating through a virtual transmittance q ′, contain V Uc untagged bits. These coding U
pulses then propagate through another virtual transmittance λ′, and we can calculate the output
photon number probabilities, which are identical to the output photon number probabilities
generated by sending the coding U pulses through the real transmittance qλ= q ′λ′.
Note that it is not clear to us how to use the random sampling theorem to estimate the
number of untagged coding ‘U’ pulses from the number of untagged coding ‘L’ pulses. This
is due to the correlations between corresponding ‘L’ and ‘U’ pulses. As discussed before, their
photon numbers are not independent variables. We are applying a restricted sampling where we
draw only one sample from each pair of U and L pulses.
A common imperfection is the inaccuracy of the beam splitting ratio q. One can calibrate
the value of q, but only with a finite resolution. In the security analysis, one should pick the
most conservative value of q within the calibrated range, that is, the value of q that suggests the
lowest key generation rate. A similar strategy should be applied to the inaccuracy of internal
transmittance λ.
4. Efficient passive estimate on an untrusted source
In the above analysis, only half pulses (coding pulses) are used to generate the secure key. Note
that we can also use the measurement result of coding ‘L’ pulses to estimate the number of
untagged sampling ‘U’ pulses as there is no physical difference between sampling pulses and
coding pulses. Note that Alice has the knowledge of the number of untagged coding ‘L’ pulses.
We have the following statement:
Corollary 2. Consider k pulses sent from an unknown and untrusted source to Alice, where k is
a large positive integer. Alice randomly assigns each input pulse as either a sampling pulse or a
coding pulse with equal probabilities. Define variables V Lc and V Us as the number of untagged
coding L pulses and the number of untagged sampling U pulses, respectively. Here U pulses
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are defined as pulses sent to the encoder in figure 4, and L pulses are defined as pulses sent to
the intensity monitor in figure 4. Alice can conclude that V Us > V Lc − 2k with confidence level
τ2 > 1− e−k22/2. Here 2 is a small positive real number chosen by Alice and Bob.
A natural question is: since Alice has knowledge about both V Ls and V Lc , how can she
estimate the number of total untagged U pulses, V U (= V Us + V Uc )?
Combining all untagged U bits is not entirely trivial. Consider that the untrusted source
generates k pulses. Each of them is divided into two pulses. Therefore Alice and Bob have
2k pulses to analyze. However, these 2k pulses are not independent because the beam splitter
clearly creates correlations between the corresponding L pulse and U pulse. A naïve application
of the random sampling theorem, ignoring the correlation between U pulses and L pulses, may
lead to a security loophole.
Lemma 2. Consider k pulses sent from an unknown and untrusted source to Alice. Alice
randomly assigns each input pulse as either a sampling pulse or a coding pulse with equal
probabilities. Each input pulse is split into a U pulse and an L pulse (see figure 4 for
visualization). The probability that V U 6 V Ls + V Lc − 1k − 2k satisfies
P(V U 6 V Ls + V Lc − (1 + 2)k)6 exp
(−k21
2
)
+ exp
(−k22
2
)
. (6)
Proof. See appendix D. uunionsq
In real experiment, it is convenient to count all the untagged L pulses, defined as variable
V L (= V Ls + V Lc ). Can we estimate V U directly from V L?
Proposition 1. Consider k pulses sent from an unknown and untrusted source to Alice. Alice
randomly assigns each input pulse as either a sampling pulse or a coding pulse with equal
probabilities. The probability that V U 6 V L − k satisfies
P(V U 6 V L − k)6 2 exp
(−k2
4
)
. (7)
That is, Alice can conclude that V U > V L − k with confidence level
τ > 1− 2 exp
(−k2
4
)
. (8)
Proof. This is a natural conclusion from Lemma 2. Note that V L = V Ls + V Lc . If Alice chooses
1 = 2 = /2, equation (6) reduces to equation (7). uunionsq
Once the number of untagged bits that are sent to Bob is estimated, the final key generation
rate can be calculated [21].
5. Numerical simulation
We performed numerical simulation to test the efficiencies of the active and passive estimates.
Here, we define the key generation rate as secure key bits per pulse sent by the source, which
New Journal of Physics 12 (2010) 023024 (http://www.njp.org/)
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Table 1. Simulation parameters from GYS [29].
ηdet α Y0 edet
4.5% 0.21 dB km−1 1.7× 10−6 3.3%
may be controlled by an eavesdropper. This is different from the definition used in [21], where
the key generation rate is defined as secure key bits per pulse sent by Alice. Note that, in the
passive scheme, all the pulses sent by the source are sent from Alice to Bob, whereas in
the active scheme, only half of the pulses sent by the source are sent from Alice to Bob.
Therefore, for the same setup, we can expect the key generation rate suggested by the passive
scheme to be roughly twice as high as that by the active scheme. However, the equivalent input
photon number in the passive scheme is lower than that of the active scheme, which introduces
a competing factor. The comparison between passive and active estimates is discussed in the
following sections.
5.1. Simulation techniques
The simulation technique in this paper is similar to that presented in [21] with a few
improvements. Here we briefly reiterate it: firstly, we simulate the experimental outputs based
on the parameters reported by Gobby et al [29], which are shown in table 1. At this stage, we
assume that the source is Poissonian with an average output photon number M . For a QKD
setup with channel transmittance η (= e−αl , where α is the fiber loss coefficient and l is the fiber
length between Alice and Bob), Bob’s quantum detection efficiency ηBob, detector intrinsic error
rate edet and background rate Y0, the gain5 and the QBER of the signals are expected to be [10]
Qe = Y0 + 1− exp(−ηηBob Mλ),
Ee = e0Y0 + edet[1− exp(−ηηBob Mλ)]Qe ,
(9)
respectively. Here Qe and Ee refer to the experimentally measured overall properties rather than
the properties of the untagged bits. Secondly, we calculate the secure key generation rate. The
general expression of the secure key generation rate per pulse sent by Alice is given by [5, 9]
R > 12 [−Qe f (Ee)H2(Ee)+ Q1(1− H2(e1))], (10)
where f (> 1) is the bi-directional error correction inefficiency ( f = 1 iff the error correction
procedure achieves the Shannon limit), H2 is the binary Shannon entropy, Q1 is the gain of the
single photon state in untagged bits and e1 is the QBER of the single photon state in untagged
bits. Qe and Ee can be experimentally measured. Here, we use equations (9) to simulate the
experimental outputs.
Q1 and e1 need to be estimated. Here, we use the method described in appendix B. The key
assumption for decoy state QKD with an untrusted source is that Ym,n is identical for different
states, and so is em,n [21]. Here Ym,n is the conditional probability that Bob’s detectors click
5 The gain is defined to be the ratio of the number of receiver Bob’s detection events to the number of signals
emitted by sender Alice in the cases where Alice and Bob use the same basis. It depends mainly on the intensity of
signal, channel transmittance and Bob’s quantum efficiency.
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given that this bit enters Alice’s lab with photon number m and emits from Alice’s lab with
photon number n, and em,n is the QBER of bits with m input photons and n output photons.
At the second stage, we do not make any assumption about the source. That is, Alice
and Bob have to characterize the source from the experimental output. Note that we need
to set the values of λ and δ (recall that all untagged bits have input photon numbers m ∈
[(1− δ)M, (1 + δ)M], where δ is a small positive real number, M is a large positive integer
and both δ and M are chosen by Alice and Bob). It is preferable to set λ and δ to the values that
yield the highest final key generation rate. We optimize the values of λ and δ numerically by
exhaustive search. Moreover, in the simulation of decoy state QKD with a finite data size, we
also need to optimize the portion of each state.
As a clarification, our security analysis does not require any additional assumptions of the
source to analyze experimental outputs.
An important improvement is that the value of δ is optimized at all distances in the
following simulations, while δ is set to be constant in [21]. This is because for different
channel losses, the optimal value of δ can vary. Moreover, several important practical factors
are considered, including the unique characteristic of plug&play structure, intensity monitor
imperfections and finite data size.
For ease of calculation, similar to in [21], we approximate the Poisson distribution as a
Gaussian distribution centered at M with variance σ 2 = M . This is an excellent approximation
because M is very large (103 or larger) in all the simulations presented below.
There are various types of imperfections and errors. We will consider them one by one
in the following sections. In section 5.3, we consider the asymmetry of the beam splitter. In
section 5.4, we consider the source attenuation introduced by the bi-directional scheme.
In section 5.5, we consider the inefficiency and the inaccuracy of the intensity monitor.
In section 5.6, we consider the statistical fluctuation due to a finite data size.
5.2. Infinite data size with perfect intensity monitor
In the asymptotic case, Alice sends infinitely many bits to Bob (i.e. k →∞). Therefore we can
set → 0 while still having τ → 1.
We assume that the intensity monitor is efficient and noiseless. Similarly to the case in [21],
we set M = 106. Moreover, we set q = 0.5 as the 50/50 beam splitter is widely used in many
applications.
The simulation results of the GLLP protocol [5], weak + vacuum decoy state protocol [10]
and one-decoy protocol [10] are shown in figures 5, 6 and 7, respectively. We can see that the
key generation rate of the passive estimate scheme on an untrusted source is very close to that
on a trusted source, whereas the key generation rate of the active estimate scheme is roughly
1/2 of that of the passive scheme. This is expected because in the active scheme, only half of
the pulses generated by the source are sent to Bob, whereas in the passive scheme, all the pulses
generated by the source are sent to Bob. Note that, in the asymptotic case, the efficiency of the
active estimate scheme can be doubled by sending most pulses (asymptotically all the pulses)
to Bob. In this case, there are still infinitely many pulses sent to the intensity monitor.
For ease of discussion, in the passive estimate scheme, we define untagged bits as bits with
input photon number mp ∈ [(1− δp)Mp, (1 + δp)Mp], whereas in the active estimate scheme, we
define untagged bits as bits with input photon number ma ∈ [(1− δa)Ma, (1 + δa)Ma]. Here δp
and δa are small positive real numbers chosen by Alice and Bob, and Mp and Ma are large
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Figure 5. Simulation result of GLLP [5] protocol with infinite data size,
symmetric beam splitter, perfect intensity monitor and uni-directional structure.
We assume that the source is Poissonian centered at M = 106 photons per pulse,
and the beam splitting ratio q = 0.5. See experimental parameters in table 1.
We calculated the ratio of the key generation rate with an untrusted source over
that with a trusted source. For the passive estimate scheme, the ratios are 98.4,
98.1 and 79.8% at 1, 20 and 40 km, respectively. For the active estimate scheme,
the ratios are 49.4, 49.3 and 42.8% at 1, 20 and 40 km, respectively.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
10
−9
10
−7
10
−5
10
−3
Distance (km)
K
ey
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
ra
te
 (
pe
r 
pu
ls
e)
 
 
Passive untrusted source
Active untrusted source
Trusted source
137 138
10
−9
10
−8
10
−7
 
 
Figure 6. Simulation result of weak + vacuum [10] protocol with infinite data
size, symmetric beam splitter, perfect intensity monitor and uni-directional
structure. We assume that the source is Poissonian centered at M = 106 photons
per pulse, and the beam splitting ratio q = 0.5. See experimental parameters in
table 1. We calculated the ratio of the key generation rate with an untrusted
source over that with a trusted source. For the passive estimate scheme, the
ratios are 77.7, 77.1 and 73.8% at 1, 50 and 100 km, respectively. For the active
estimate scheme, the ratios are 39.2, 39.0 and 37.4% at 1, 50 and 100 km,
respectively.
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Figure 7. Simulation result of the one-decoy [10] protocol with infinite data size,
symmetric beam splitter, perfect intensity monitor and uni-directional structure.
We assume that the source is Poissonian centered at M = 106 photons per pulse,
and the beam splitting ratio q = 0.5. See experimental parameters in table 1. We
calculated the ratio of the key generation rate with an untrusted source over that
with a trusted source. For the passive estimate scheme, the ratios are 71.5, 68.6
and 39.5% at 1, 50 and 100 km, respectively. For the active estimate scheme, the
ratios are 38.0, 36.7 and 24.4% at 1, 50 and 100 km, respectively.
positive integers chosen by Alice and Bob. In the passive estimate scheme, we define the
maximum possible tagged ratio as 1p. In the active estimate scheme, we define the maximum
possible tagged ratio as1a. Here the tagged ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of tagged
bits over the number of all the bits sent to Bob.
By magnifying the tails at long distances (shown in the insets of figures 5–7), we can see
that the active schemes suggest a higher key generation rate than the passive schemes do in all
three protocols. This behavior is related to the following fact: in the passive estimate scheme,
the equivalent input photon number is lower than that of the active estimate scheme. This is
because the input photon number is defined as the photons counted by the intensity monitor,
and only a portion of an input pulse is sent to the intensity monitor in the passive scheme.
Compared to the active scheme, lower input photon number in the passive scheme leads to
a larger coefficient of variation of measured input photon number distribution, assuming the
source is Poissonian. Therefore, for the same source, if one sets δp = δa, 1p will be greater than
1a.
6 Increasing the coefficient of variation of the measured input photon number distribution
will in general deteriorate the efficiency of the estimate for QKD with untrusted sources. Take
two extreme cases for example: if the coefficient of variation is very large, which means the
input photon number distribution is almost a uniform distribution, then the estimate efficiency
will be very poor because either δ or1 (or both) will be very large. If the coefficient of variation
6 The values of δ in the passive estimate and the active estimate schemes are optimized separately in our
simulation. The optimal value of δp usually deviates from the optimal value of δa with the same experimental
parameters. Here we cite ‘δp = δa’ just to illustrate an intuitive understanding of the phenomena shown in the insets
of figures 5–7.
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is very small, which means the input photon number distribution is almost a delta function,
then the estimate efficiency will be very good because both δ and 1 can be very small.
The estimate of the gain of untagged bits is very sensitive to the value of 1, especially
when the experimentally measured overall gain is small (i.e. when the distance is long, which
corresponds to the tails of figures 5–7). The estimate of untagged bits’ gain is discussed in
section 3 of [21]. Here we briefly recapitulate the main idea: Alice cannot, in practice, perform
a QND measurement on the photon numbers of input pulses. Therefore, Alice and Bob do not
know which bits are tagged and which are untagged, although they can estimate the minimum
number of untagged bits. Without knowing which bits are untagged, Alice and Bob cannot
measure the exact gain Q of untagged bits. Alice and Bob can only experimentally measure the
overall gain Qe, which contains contributions from both tagged bits and untagged bits.
Alice and Bob can still estimate the upper and lower bounds of Q. They can first estimate
the maximum tagged ratio 1. This estimate can be obtained either actively as proposed in [21]
or passively as discussed in this paper. Alice and Bob can then estimate the upper and lower
bounds of Q as follows [21]:
Q = Qe
1−1−  ,
Q = max
(
0,
Qe −1− 
1−1− 
)
.
(11)
Q is very sensitive to 1 when Qe is small. Therefore, when the distance is long (which
corresponds to the tails of figures 5–7), Qe becomes very small, and Q will then be very sensitive
to 1. Since 1p >1a, the passive estimate becomes less efficient than the active estimate in this
case.
On the other hand, in short distances, Qe is significantly greater than 1p and 1a; therefore
the difference between1p and1a makes a negligible contribution to the performance difference
between the passive and active estimates. At short distances, it is the following fact that
dominates the performance difference between these two schemes: the passive estimate scheme
can send Bob twice as many pulses as the active estimate scheme can.
One can increase δ to decrease 1p. That is, if one intends to ensure that 1p =1a, one has
to set δp > δa. However, increasing δ also has a negative effect on the key generation rate. This
is discussed in sections 3 and 4 of [21].
In brief, lower input photon number is the reason why the passive estimate suggests a
lower key generation rate than the active estimate does around maximum transmission distances
in all of the three simulated protocols. This will be confirmed in the simulation presented in
sections 5.3–5.6.
5.3. Biased beam splitter
A natural measure to improve the efficiency of the passive estimate is to increase input
photon number. Note that in the passive estimate, as discussed in section 3, input photon
numbers are the photon numbers counted by the intensity monitor. Therefore, it can improve
the passive estimate’s efficiency to send more photons to the intensity monitor (i.e. setting q
smaller).
To test this postulate, we performed another simulation to compare the performance of the
passive estimate with different values of q. Similar to the above subsection, we assume that the
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Figure 8. Simulation results for the weak + vacuum protocol [10] with different
beam splitters for passive estimate. We assume that the data size is infinite,
the intensity monitor is perfect, the source is Poissonian centered at M = 106
photons per pulse and the system is in uni-directional structure. See experimental
parameters in table 1. The results are focused at the maximum transmission
distance to illustrate the improvement of passive estimate by using a biased beam
splitter that sends more photons into the intensity monitor. This is equivalent to
increasing input photon numbers in the passive scheme.
intensity monitor is efficient and noiseless, and data size is infinite. Therefore  = 0. We set
M = 106 at the source.
The simulation results are shown in figure 8. We can clearly see that by setting q to a
smaller value (1%), the key generation rate of the passive estimate scheme is improved around
the maximum transmission distance.
Intuitively, one can improve the efficiency of the active scheme by sending most pulses to
Bob. One can refer to the discussion in appendix C below equation (C.4) as a starting point.
Detailed discussion of optimizing the efficiency of the active estimate scheme is beyond the
scope of the current paper and is subject to further investigation.
5.4. Plug&play setup
In the plug&play QKD scheme, the source is located in Bob’s lab. Bright pulses sent by Bob
will suffer the whole channel loss before entering Alice’s lab. Therefore, in the plug&play setup,
Alice’s average input photon number is dependent of the channel loss between Alice and Bob.
If the average photon number per pulse at the source in Bob’s lab, MB, is constant, the average
input photon number per pulse in Alice’s lab, M , decreases as the channel loss increases.
Similar to the above subsection, we assume that the intensity monitor is efficient and
noiseless, and data size is infinite. Therefore  = 0. We set MB = 106 at the source in Bob’s
lab. We set q = 1% to improve the passive estimate efficiency.
We clarify that ‘distance’ in all the simulations of the bi-directional QKD setup refers to a
one-way distance between Alice and Bob, not a round-trip distance.
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Figure 9. Simulation result of the weak + vacuum [10] protocol with infinite
data size, asymmetric beam splitter, perfect intensity monitor and bi-directional
structure. We assume that the source in Bob’s lab is Poissonian centered at MB =
106 photons per pulse, and the beam splitting ratio q = 0.01. See experimental
parameters in table 1. We calculated the ratio of the key generation rate with an
untrusted source over that with a trusted source. For the passive estimate scheme,
the ratios are 78.5, 75.0 and 63.0% at 1, 50 and 100 km, respectively. For the
active estimate scheme, the ratios are 39.2, 37.5 and 31.5% at 1, 50 and 100 km,
respectively. Comparing with figure 6, we can see that the bi-directional nature of
the plug&play setup reduced the efficiencies of both active and passive estimates
on an untrusted source.
The simulation results of weak + vacuum protocol [10] are shown in figure 9. We can see
that the bi-directional nature plug&play structure clearly deteriorates the performance at long
distances for which the input photon number on Alice’s side is largely reduced. This affects
both the passive and active estimates.
A natural measure to improve the performance of the plug&play setup is to use a brighter
source. By setting MB = 108 at the source in Bob’s lab, the performances for both passive and
active estimates are improved substantially as shown in figure 10. Note that subnanosecond
pulses with ∼108 photons per pulse can be routinely generated with directly modulated laser
diodes.
5.5. Imperfections of the intensity monitor
There are two major imperfections of the intensity monitor: inefficiency and noise. These
imperfections are discussed in section 3. The inefficiency can be easily modeled as additional
loss in the simulation.
There can be various noise sources, including thermal noise, shot noise, etc. Here, we
consider a simple noise model where a constant Gaussian noise with variance σ 2IM is assumed.
That is, if m photons enter an efficient but noisy intensity monitor, the probability that the
measured photon number is m ′ obeys a Gaussian distribution
Pm(m ′)= 1
σIM
√
2pi
exp
[
−(m −m
′)2
2σ 2IM
]
.
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Figure 10. Simulation result of the weak + vacuum [10] protocol with infinite
data size, asymmetric beam splitter, perfect intensity monitor, bi-directional
structure and a bright light source. We assume that the source in Bob’s lab is
Poissonian centered at MB = 108 photons per pulse, and the beam splitting ratio
q = 0.01. See experimental parameters in table 1. We calculated the ratio of the
key generation rate with an untrusted source over that with a trusted source. For
the passive estimate scheme, the ratios are 80.3, 79.6 and 75.8% at 1, 50 and
100 km, respectively. For the active estimate scheme, the ratios are 40.1, 39.8
and 37.9% at 1, 50, and 100 km, respectively. Comparing with figure 9, we can
see that the estimate efficiencies for both the active and passive schemes are
improved by using a brighter source.
The measured photon number distribution P(m ′) has larger variation than the actual photon
number distribution P(m) due to the noise of the intensity monitor. More concretely, if the
actual photon numbers obey a Gaussian distribution centered at M with variance σ 2, the
measured photon numbers also obey a Gaussian distribution centered at M , but with a variance
σ 2 + σ 2IM.
As in the previous subsections, we assume that the data size is infinite. Therefore  = 0.
We set MB = 108 at the source in Bob’s lab. The plug&play setup is assumed. We set q = 1%
to improve the passive estimate efficiency. The imperfections of the intensity monitor are
set as follows: the efficiency is set as ηIM = 0.7, and the noise is set as σIM = 105 (see
experimental parameters in sections 5.7 and 6). For ease of simulation, we assume that the
intensity monitor conservative interval is constant7 over different input photon numbers. We set
ς = 6σIM = 6× 105 to ensure a conservative estimate.
The simulation results for weak + vacuum protocol [10] are shown in figure 11. We can
see that the detector noise significantly affects the performance of the plug&play QKD system.
This is because at long distances, the bi-directional nature of the plug&play setup reduces the
input photon number on Alice’s side. Intensity monitor noise and the conservative interval are
assumed as constants regardless of the input photon number in our simulation. Therefore they
7 The assumption of constant conservative interval may not precisely describe the inaccuracy of the intensity
monitor in realistic applications. Nonetheless, some factors, like finite resolution of analogue–digital conversion,
may indeed be constant at different intensity levels. We remark that the noises of different intensity monitors may
vary largely. Detailed investigation of the intensity monitor noise modeling is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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Figure 11. Simulation result of the weak + vacuum [10] protocol with infinite
data size, asymmetric beam splitter, imperfect intensity monitor and bi-
directional structure. We assume that the intensity monitor efficiency ηIM = 0.7,
the intensity monitor noise σIM = 105, the intensity monitor conservative interval
ς = 6× 105, the source in Bob’s lab is Poissonian centered at MB = 108 photons
per pulse and the beam splitting ratio q = 0.01. See experimental parameters
in table 1. Comparing with figure 9, we can see that the imperfections of the
intensity monitor substantially reduce the efficiencies of both active and passive
estimates.
become critical issues when the input photon number is low. As a result, the key generation rate
at long distance is substantially reduced.
The above postulate is confirmed by the simulations shown in figures 12 and 13. In
figure 12, we assume that the source in Bob’s lab is extremely bright (sending out 1010 photons
per pulse). We can see clearly that when the input photon number on Alice’s side is high, the key
generation rate is affected only slightly by the imperfections of the intensity monitor. Although
it is challenging to build such bright pulsed laser diodes (1010 photons per pulse with pulse width
less than 1 ns) at telecom wavelengths, one can simply attach a fiber amplifier to the laser diode
to generate very bright pulses. Nonetheless, at such a high intensity level, nonlinear effects in
the fiber, like self-phase modulation, may be significant [30].
An alternative solution is to use the uni-directional setting, in which the photon number per
pulse is constantly high on Alice’s side. From figure 13 we can see that using the uni-directional
setting can also minimize the negative effects introduced by the imperfections of the intensity
monitor. Nonetheless, if one adopts the uni-directional QKD scheme, one will lose the unique
advantages of the bi-directional QKD scheme, like the intrinsic stability against the polarization
dispersion and the phase drift. Note that adopting the uni-directional scheme does not mean that
the coherent state assumption is valid. Indeed, even if Alice possesses the source, the source
may not be Poissonian and Alice may not have a full characterization of the source without
real-time monitoring.
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Figure 12. Simulation result of the weak + vacuum [10] protocol with infinite
data size, asymmetric beam splitter, imperfect intensity monitor, bi-directional
structure and a very bright source. We assume that the intensity monitor
efficiency ηIM = 0.7, the intensity monitor noise σIM = 105, the intensity monitor
conservative interval ς = 6× 105, the source in Bob’s lab is Poissonian
centered at MB = 1010 photons per pulse and the beam splitting ratio q = 0.01.
Experimental parameters are cited in table 1. Comparing with figure 11, we
can see that using a brighter source can effectively improve the efficiencies of
both passive and active estimates. Although it is challenging to build such bright
pulsed laser diodes (1010 photons per pulse with pulse width less than 1 ns) at
telecom wavelengths, one can simply attach a fiber amplifier to the laser diode to
generate very bright pulses. Nonetheless, at such a high intensity level, nonlinear
effects in the fiber, like self-phase modulation, may be significant [30].
5.6. Finite data size
Real experiments are performed within a limited time, during which the source can only
generate a finite number of pulses. To be consistent with previous analysis, we assume that the
source generates k pulses in an experiment. Reducing the data size from infinite to finite has two
consequences: Firstly, if the confidence level τ as defined in equation (8) (for passive estimate)
or in equation (2) (for active estimate) is expected to be close to 1,  has to be positive. More
concretely, for a fixed k, if the estimate on the untrusted source is expected to have confidence
level not less than τ , one has to pick  as
p =
√
−4 ln((1− τ)/(2))
k
in the passive estimate scheme, or
a =
√
−2 ln(1− τ)
k
in the active estimate scheme. Secondly, in decoy state protocols [10], the statistical fluctuations
of experimental outputs have to be considered. The technique to analyze the statistical
fluctuation in decoy state protocols for numerical simulation is discussed in [10, 12, 14].
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Figure 13. Simulation result of the weak + vacuum [10] protocol with infinite
data size, asymmetric beam splitter, imperfect intensity monitor and uni-
directional structure. We assume that the intensity monitor efficiency ηIM = 0.7,
the intensity monitor noise σIM = 105, the intensity monitor conservative interval
ς = 6× 105, the source is Poissonian centered at M = 108 photons per pulse and
the beam splitting ratio q = 0.01. Citing experimental parameters from table 1
and comparing with figure 11, we can see that uni-directional structure can
effectively improve the efficiencies of both passive and active estimates.
In the simulation presented in figure 14, we assume that the data size is 1012 bits (i.e. the
source generates 1012 pulses in one experiment). This data size is reasonable for the optical
layer of the QKD system because reliable gigahertz QKD implementations have been reported
in several recent works [27, 31, 32]. 1012 bits can be generated within a few minutes in
these gigahertz QKD systems. We set the confidence level as τ > 1–10−10, which suggest that
a = 6.79× 10−5 and p = 9.74× 10−5. We consider six standard deviations in the statistical
fluctuation analysis of the weak + vacuum protocol.
As in the previous subsections, we set MB = 108 at the source in Bob’s lab. A plug&play
setup is assumed. We set q = 1% to improve the passive estimate efficiency. The imperfections
of the intensity monitor are set as follows: the efficiency is set as ηIM = 0.7 and the noise
is set constant as σIM = 105. The intensity monitor conservative interval is set constant as
ς = 6σIM = 6× 105.
The simulation results for the weak + vacuum protocol [10] are shown in figure 14. We
can see that finite data size clearly reduces the efficiencies of both active and passive estimates.
The aforementioned two consequences of finite data size contribute to this efficiency reduction:
Firstly,  is nonzero in this finite data size case. Therefore, the estimate of the lower bound of
untagged bits’ gain is worse as reflected in equation (11). Note that  has the same weight
as 1 in equation (11). Secondly, the statistical fluctuation for the weak + vacuum protocol
becomes important [14]. Moreover, the tightness of bounds suggested in lemma 1, lemma 2
and proposition 1 may also affect the estimate efficiency in finite data size.
As we showed in section 5.5, using a very bright source can improve the efficiencies of
both passive and active estimates. Here we again adjust the source intensity in Bob’s lab as
MB = 1010. The results are shown in figure 15. We can see that using a very bright source
can improve the efficiencies of both passive and active estimates in the finite data size case.
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Figure 14. Simulation results of the weak + vacuum [10] protocol with finite
data size, asymmetric beam splitter, imperfect intensity monitor and bi-
directional structure. We assume that the data size is 1012, the intensity monitor
efficiency ηIM = 0.7, the intensity monitor noise σIM = 105, the intensity monitor
conservative interval ς = 6× 105, the source in Bob’s lab is Poissonian centered
at MB = 108 photons per pulse and the beam splitting ratio q = 0.01. Confidence
level is set as τ > 1− 10−10. Six standard deviations are considered in the
statistical fluctuation. See experimental parameters in table 1. Comparing with
figure 11, we can see that finite data size reduces efficiencies of both active and
passive estimates.
As we mentioned in section 5.5, such brightness (1010 photons per pulse) is achievable with a
pulsed laser diode and a fiber laser amplifier. However, nonlinear effects should be carefully
considered [30].
In future studies, it would be worthwhile to incorporate the finite key length security
analyses [33]–[37] in the key generation rate calculation.
5.7. Simulating the setup in [28]
Peng et al [28] report so far the only experimental implementation of QKD that considers the
untrusted source imperfection. However, as we discussed above, the analysis proposed in [28] is
challenging to use, and was not applied to analyze the experimental results reported in the same
paper. Our analysis, however, provides a method to understand the experimental results of [28].
Here, we present a numerical simulation of the system used in [28].
We have to characterize the noise and conservative interval of the intensity monitor
used in [28]. The experimental results reported in [28] show that the measured input photon
number distribution is centered at M = 1.818× 107 with a standard deviation 3.097× 105
on Alice’s side. If we assume the source at Bob’s side to be Poissonian, the actual input
photon number distribution on Alice’s side will also be Poissonian. The detector noise is then
σIM =
√
(3.097× 105)2 − 1.818× 107 = 3.097× 105. We set the detector conservative interval
as constant ς = 6σIM.
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Figure 15. Simulation result of the weak + vacuum [10] protocol with finite
data size, asymmetric beam splitter, imperfect intensity monitor, bi-directional
structure and very bright source. We assume that the data size is 1012, the
intensity monitor efficiency ηIM = 0.7, the intensity monitor noise σIM = 105,
the intensity monitor conservative interval ς = 6× 105, the source in Bob’s lab
is Poissonian centered at MB = 1010 photons per pulse and the beam splitting
ratio q = 0.01. Confidence level is set as τ > 1− 10−10. Six standard deviations
are considered in the statistical fluctuation. Citing experimental parameters from
table 1. Comparing with figure 11, we can see that using a very bright source can
improve efficiencies of both active and passive estimates.
Source intensity at Bob’s side MB can be calculated in the following manner: since
M = 1.818× 107 at a distance l = 25 km and beam splitting ratio q = 0.05, we can conclude
that
MB = M
αl(1− q) = 6.411× 10
7.
Here we assume that the fiber loss coefficient α =−0.21 dB km−1.
The other parameters are directly cited from [28]: the setup is in plug&play structure.
The efficiency of the intensity monitor is ηIM = 0.8. Single photon detector efficiency is 4%,
detector error rate is 1.39% and background rate Y0 = 9.38× 10−5. As in the previous sections,
confidence level is set as τ > 1–10−10.
In the experiment reported in [28], the data size is 9.05× 107. (It is smaller than the
data size we assumed in other simulations. If a larger data size were used, we would expect
some improvements in the simulation results.) We ran numerical simulation with six standard
deviations that are considered in the statistical fluctuation. The simulation results are shown in
figure 16. It is encouraging to see that the simulation yields positive key rates for both passive
and active estimates at short distances.
5.8. Summary
From the numerical simulations shown in figures 5–16, we conclude that four important
parameters can improve the efficiency of passive estimate on an untrusted source: Firstly, the
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Figure 16. Simulation result of the weak + vacuum [10] protocol based on the
experimental parameters in [28]: data size is 9.05× 107 (this data size is reported
in [28]. It is smaller than the data size we assumed in other simulations. If a
larger data size was used, we would expect some improvements on the simulation
results), the intensity monitor efficiency ηIM = 0.8, the intensity monitor noise
σIM = 3.097× 105, the intensity monitor conservative interval ς = 6σIM, the
source at Bob’s side is Poissonian centered at MB = 6.411× 107 photons
per pulse, the beam splitting ratio q = 0.05 and the system is in plug&play.
Confidence level is set as τ > 1–10−10. Six standard deviations are considered in
the statistical fluctuation. Single photon detector efficiency is 4%, detector error
rate is 1.39% and background rate Y0 = 9.38× 10−5. Comparing with figure 14,
we can see that a higher background rate limits the system performance.
beam splitting ratio q should be very small, say 1%, to send most input photons to the intensity
monitor. Secondly, the light source should be very bright (say, 1010 photons per pulse). This
is particularly important for plug&play structure. Thirdly, the imperfections of the intensity
monitor should be small. That is, the intensity monitor should have high efficiency (say, over
70%) and high precision (say, can resolve photon number difference of 6× 105). Fourthly, the
data size should be large (say, 1012 bits) to minimize the statistical fluctuation.
In brief, a largely biased beam splitter, a bright source, an efficient and precise intensity
monitor and a large data size are four key conditions that can substantially improve the efficiency
of the passive estimate on an untrusted source. The latter three conditions are also applicable to
the active estimate scheme.
An important advantage of decoy state protocols is that the key generation rate will
only drop linearly as channel transmittance decreases [7]–[14], whereas in many non-decoy
protocols, like the GLLP protocol [5], the key generation rate will drop quadratically as channel
transmittance decreases. In the simulations shown in figures 6–16, we can see that this important
advantage is preserved even if the source is unknown and untrusted.
6. Preliminary experimental test
We performed some preliminary experiments to test our analysis. The basic idea is to measure
some key parameters of our system, especially the characteristics of the source, with which we
can perform numerical simulation to show the expected performance.
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Figure 17. Experimental setup. Alice and Bob: commercial plug&play QKD
system. PD: photodiode. OSC: high-speed oscilloscope. 1/99 BS: 1/99 beam
splitter. FM: Faraday mirror. PMx: phase modulators. PBS: polarizing beam
splitter. BS: beam splitter. SPDx: single photon detector. C: circulator.
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Figure 18. Experimentally measured photon number statistics for 299 700
pulses. The distribution centered at 5.101× 106 photons per pulse, with standard
deviation 6.557× 104. The blue line shows a Gaussian fit of the actual
distribution.
The experimental setup is shown in figure 17. It is essentially a modified commercial
plug&play QKD system. We added a 1/99 beam splitter (1/99 BS in figure 17), a photodiode
(PD in figure 17) and a high-speed oscilloscope (OSC in figure 17) on Alice’s side. These three
parts constitute Alice’s PNA.
When Bob sends strong laser pulses to Alice, the photodiode (PD in figure 17)
will convert input photons into photoelectrons, which are then recorded by the oscilloscope
(OSC in figure 17). In the recorded waveform, we calculated the area below each pulse. This
area is proportional to the number of input photons. The conversion coefficient between the
area and photon number is calibrated by measuring the average input laser power on Alice’s
side with a slow optical power meter.
In our experiment, 299 700 pulses are generated by the laser diode at Bob’s side (laser
diode in figure 17) at a repetition rate of 5 MHz with 1 ns pulse width. They are all split into
U pulses and L pulses (see figure 4) by the 1/99 beam splitter (1/99 BS in figure 17). The L
pulses are measured by a photodiode (PD in figure 17). The measurement results are acquired
and recorded by an oscilloscope (OSC in figure 17).
The experimental results of the photon number statistics are plotted in figure 18. The
measured photon number distribution is centered at M = 5.101× 106 photons per pulse, with
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Table 2. Parameters measured from our preliminary experiment described
in section 6.
α ηdet edet Y0
−0.21 dB km−1 4.89% 0.21% 8.4× 10−5
standard deviation 6.557× 104 on Alice’s side. We can see that the actual photon number
distribution fits a Gaussian distribution (shown as the blue line) well. Other experimental results
are shown in table 2.
The intensity monitor noise is calculated in a similar manner to that in section 5.7:
assuming the source is Poissonian at Bob’s side, which means the actual input
photon number on Alice’s side is also Poissonian, the noise is then given by σIM =√
(6.557× 104)2 − 5.101× 106 = 6.553× 104. As in section 5.7, we set the detector
conservative interval as a constant ς = 6σIM.
Source intensity at Bob’s side MB can be calculated in the following matter (which is
similar to the one we used in section 5.7): since M = 5.101× 106 at a distance l = 4.8 km, and
beam splitting ratio q = 0.01, we can conclude that
MB = M
αl(1− q) = 6.500× 10
6.
Here we know that the fiber loss coefficient α =−0.21 dB km−1.
The simulation result is shown in figure 19, in which the data size is set as 1012.8 We can see
that it is possible to achieve positive key rate at moderate distances using the security analysis
presented in this paper.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we present the first passive security analysis for QKD with an untrusted source,
with a complete security proof. Our proposal is compatible with inefficient and noisy intensity
monitors, which is not considered in [21] or in [28]. Our analysis is also compatible with a
finite data size, which is not considered in [28]. Comparing with the active estimate scheme
proposed in [21], the passive scheme proposed in this paper significantly reduces the challenges
to implement the ‘plug&play’ QKD with unconditional security. Our proposal can be applied
to practical QKD setups with untrusted sources, especially the plug&play QKD setups, to
guarantee the security.
We point out four important conditions that can improve the efficiency of the passive
estimate scheme proposed in this paper: firstly, the beam splitter in PNA should be largely
biased to send most photons to the intensity monitor. Secondly, the light source should be bright.
Thirdly, the intensity monitor should have high efficiency and precision. Fourthly, the data size
should be large to minimize the statistical fluctuation. These four conditions are confirmed in
extensive numerical simulations.
8 Data size in our experiment is much smaller than the data size assumed in numerical simulation. The purpose
of our preliminary experiment is to test whether it is possible to achieve positive key rate with our current
system.
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Figure 19. Simulation result of the weak + vacuum [10] protocol based on
experimental parameters from our QKD system. We assume that the data size
is 1012 bits, the intensity monitor efficiency ηIM = 0.7, the intensity monitor
noise σIM = 6.553× 104, the intensity monitor conservative interval ς = 6σIM,
the source at Bob’s lab is Poissonian centered at MB = 6.500× 106 photons
per pulse, the beam splitting ratio q = 0.01 and the system is in the plug&play
structure. Confidence level is set as τ > 1− 10−10. Six standard deviations are
considered in the statistical fluctuation. Experimental parameters are listed in
table 2.
In the simulations shown in figures 11–16 and 19, we made an additional assumption that
the intensity monitor has a constant Gaussian noise. This assumption is not required by our
security analysis. It will be interesting to experimentally verify this model in future.
The numerical simulations show that if the above conditions are met, the efficiency of the
passive untrusted source estimate is close to that of the trusted source estimate, and is roughly
twice as high as the efficiency of the active untrusted source estimate. Nonetheless, the efficiency
of the active estimate scheme proposed in [21] may be improved to the level that it is similar
to the efficiency of passive estimation. This is briefly discussed below in equation (C.3). The
security of the improved active estimate scheme is beyond the scope of the current paper, and is
a subject for further investigation.
Numerical simulations in figures 6–16 and 19 show that the key generation rate drops
linearly as the channel transmittance decreases. This is an important advantage of decoy state
protocols over many other QKD protocols, and is preserved in our untrusted source analysis.
Our preliminary experimental test highlights the feasibility of our proposed passive
estimate scheme. Indeed, our scheme can be easily implemented by making very simple
modifications (by adding a few commercial modules) to a commercial plug&play QKD
system.
A remaining practical question in our proposal is: How to calibrate the noise and the
conservative interval of the intensity monitor? Note that these two parameters may not be
constant at different intensity levels. Moreover, the noise may not be Gaussian. It is not
straightforward to define the conservative interval and its confidence.
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Appendix A. The phase randomization assumption
In this section, we will show that for the state that is accessible to Eve, Alice’s phase
randomization is equivalent to performing a QND measurement on the photon number of the
input pulses.
Proof. Before the phase randomization, the state that is shared by Alice, Bob and Eve is
|ψ〉ABE =
∑
m,n
bm,n|En〉|m〉. (A.1)
After the phase randomization, a random phase is applied to each pulse, and this phase is
inaccessible to Eve. The state becomes
|ψ〉prABE =
∑
m,n
bm,n|En〉|m〉eimθ . (A.2)
Its density matrix is
ρ
pr
ABE =
∑
m,n,m′,n′
bm,nb∗m′,n′|En〉〈En′| ⊗ |m〉〈m ′|ei(m−m
′)θ . (A.3)
Since θ is not known to Eve or Bob, the state that is accessible to Bob and Eve is
ρ
pr
BE =
1
2pi
∑
m,n,m′,n′
bm,nb∗m′,n′|En〉〈En′| ⊗ |m〉〈m ′|
∫ 2pi
0
ei(m−m
′)θdθ
=
∑
m,n,n′
bm,nb∗m,n′|En〉〈En′| ⊗ |m〉〈m|. (A.4)
Instead of considering the phase randomization, now let us analyze the impact of a photon
number measurement on the state given in equation (A.1). Before Alice’s measurement, the
density matrix is given by
ρABE =
∑
m,n,m′,n′
bm,nb∗m′,n′|En〉〈En′| ⊗ |m〉〈m ′|. (A.5)
After the QND measurement of the photon number, Alice knows the photon number.
However, Eve and Bob do not know Alice’s measurement result. Therefore, the state that is
accessible to Bob and Eve is given by
ρ
QND
BE =
∑
m′
|m ′〉〈m ′|ρABE|m ′〉〈m ′|
=
∑
m,n,n′
bm,nb∗m,n′|En〉〈En′| ⊗ |m〉〈m|
= ρprBE. (A.6)
uunionsq
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From the above equation, we conclude that the two different processes: (i) phase
randomization by Alice and (ii) a photon-number non-demolition measurement, actually give
exactly the same density matrix for the Eve–Bob system. Therefore, phase randomization is
mathematically equivalent to a photon-number non-demolition measurement. For this reason,
we can consider the output state by Alice as a classical mixture of Fock states.
Appendix B. Security analysis for untagged bits
In this section, for the convenience of the readers, we recapitulate the security analysis that is
presented in [21].
Assume that k pulses are sent from Alice to Bob. Alice and Bob do not know which bits
are untagged. However, either from the active estimate presented in [21] or from the passive
estimate presented in the current paper, they know that at least (1−1− )k pulses are untagged
with high confidence.
Alice and Bob can measure the overall gain Qe and the overall QBER Ee. They do not
know the gain Q and the QBER E for the untagged bits because they do not know which bits
are untagged. Nonetheless, they can then estimate the upper bounds and the lower bounds of
them. The upper bound and the lower bound of Q are [21]
Q = Qe
1−1−  ,
Q = max
(
0,
Qe −1− 
1−1− 
)
.
(B.1)
The upper bound and the lower bound of E · Q can be estimated as [21]
E · Q = Qe Ee
1−1−  ,
E · Q = max
(
0,
Qe Ee −1− 
1−1− 
)
.
(B.2)
For untagged bits (i.e. m ∈ [(1− δ)M, (1 + δ)M]), we can show that the upper bound and
the lower bound of the probability that the output photon number from Alice is n are [21]
Pn =

(1− λ)(1−δ)M if n = 0,(
(1 + δ)M
n
)
λn(1− λ)(1+δ)M−n if 16 n 6 (1 + δ)M,
0 if n > (1 + δ)M,
Pn =

(1− λ)(1+δ)M if n = 0,(
(1− δ)M
n
)
λn(1− λ)(1−δ)M−n if 16 n 6 (1− δ)M,
0 if n > (1− δ)M,
(B.3)
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under Condition 1:
(1 + δ)Mλ < 1. (B.4)
The key rate calculation depends on the QKD protocol that is implemented. For the
GLLP [5] protocol with an untrusted source, the key generation rate is given by [21]
R > 1
2
{
−Qe f (Ee)H2(Ee)+ (Q + P0 + P1 − 1)
[
1− H2
(
Qe Ee
Q + P0 + P1 − 1
)]}
, (B.5)
where Qe and Ee are measured experimentally, Q can be calculated from equation (B.1), and
P0 and P1 can be calculated from equation (B.3).
For decoy state protocols [7]–[14], the key generation rate (with an untrusted source) is
given by [21]
R > 12{−QSe f (ESe )H2(ESe )+ (1−1− )QS1[1− H2(eS1 )]}, (B.6)
where QSe and ESe are the overall gain and the over QBER of the signal states, respectively, and
can be measured experimentally. QS1 and eS1 depend on the specific decoy state protocol that is
implemented.
For the weak + vacuum protocol [10, 11, 14], the lower bound of QS1 for untagged bits is
given by [21]
QS1 = PS1
QD PS2 − QS PD2 + (PS0 PD2 − PD0 PS2 )QV −
2δM(1−λD)2δM−1 PS2
[(1−δ)M+1]!
PD1 PS2 − PS1 PD2
(B.7)
under Condition 2:
λS
λD
>
(1 + δ)M − 2
(1− δ)M − 2
[
(1 + δ)M − 2
2δM
]2δM/((1−δ)M−2) [
(1 + δ)M − 2
(1− δ)M − 2 ·
e2
2δM
]1/(2[(1−δ)M−2])
. (B.8)
Here QS, QD and QV are the gains of untagged bits of the signal state, the decoy state and the
vacuum state, respectively. Their bounds can be estimated from equations (B.1). The bounds
of the probabilities can be estimated from equations (B.3). λS and λD are Alice’s internal
transmittances for signal and decoy states, respectively. The upper bound of eS1 for untagged
bits is given by [21]
eS1 6 eS1 =
ES QS − PS0 EV QV
QS1
, (B.9)
in which ES and EV are the QBERs of untagged bits of the signal and the vacuum states,
respectively. ES QS and EV QV can be estimated from equations (B.2). PS0 can be estimated by
equations (B.3). QS1 is given by equation (B.7). EV QV can be estimated from equations (B.2).
PS0 can be estimated by equations (B.3). QS1 is given by equation (B.7).
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For one-decoy protocol [10, 13], a lower bound of QS1 and an upper bound of eS1 for
untagged bits are given by
QS1 = PS1
QD PS2 − QS PD2 + (PS0 PD2 − PD0 PS2 ) E
S QS
PS0 EV
− 2δM(1−λD)
2δM−1 PS2
[(1−δ)M+1]!
PD1 PS2 − PS1 PD2
,
eS1 =
ES · QS
QS1
,
(B.10)
respectively, under condition 2 in the asymptotic case. Here QS and QD are the gains of untagged
bits of the signal state and the decoy state, respectively. Their bounds can be estimated from
equations (B.1). ES is the QBER of untagged bits of the signal state. ES · QS can be estimated
from equations (B.2). EV = 0.5 in the asymptotic case. The bounds of the probabilities can be
estimated from equations (B.3).
Appendix C. Confidence level in active estimate
Among all the V untagged bits, each bit has probability 1/2 to be assigned as an untagged
coding bit. Therefore, the probability that Vc = vc obeys a binomial distribution. Cumulative
probability is given by [38]
P
(
Vc 6
V − k
2
|V = v
)
6 exp
(
−
2k2
2v
)
.
For any v ∈ [0, k], k/v > 1. Therefore, we have
P
(
Vc 6
V − k
2
|V ∈ [0, k]
)
6 exp
(
−k
2
2
)
.
In the experiment described by lemma 1, V ∈ [0, k] is always true. Therefore, the above
inequality reduces to
P
(
Vc 6
V − k
2
)
6 exp
(
−k
2
2
)
. (C.1)
By definition, we have
V = Vc + Vs. (C.2)
Substituting equation (C.2) into equation (C.1), we have
P(Vc 6 Vs − k)6 exp
(
−k
2
2
)
. (C.3)
The above proof can be easily generalized to the case where for each bit sent from the
untrusted source to Alice, Alice randomly assigns it as either a coding bit with probability
γ , or a sampling bit with probability 1− γ . Here γ ∈ (0, 1) is chosen by Alice. It is then
straightforward to show that
P
[
Vc 6
γ
1− γ (Vs − k)
]
6 exp(−2k2γ 2). (C.4)
When γ = 1/2, equation (C.4) reduces to equation (C.3).
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Appendix D. Confidence level in cross estimate
From corollaries 3 and 5, we know that
P(V Uc 6 V Ls − 1k)6 exp
(−k21
2
)
,
P(V Us 6 V Lc − 2k)6 exp
(−k22
2
)
.
(D.1)
Therefore, we have
P(V U 6 V Ls + V Lc − (1 + 2)k)= P(V Uc + V Us 6 V Ls + V Lc − (1 + 2)k)
6 P[(V Uc 6 V Ls − 1k) or (V Us 6 V Lc − 2k)]
6 P(V Uc 6 V Ls − 1k)+ P(V Uc 6 V Ls − 2k)
= exp
(−k21
2
)
+ exp
(−k22
2
)
. (D.2)
In the above derivation, we made use of the fact that [(V Uc 6 V Ls − 1k) or (V Us 6 V Lc − 2k)] is
always true if [V Uc + V Us 6 V Ls + V Lc − (1 + 2)k] is true.
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